Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises by Stavros Panageas
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I would like to thank Andy Abel, Andy Atkeson, Peter DeMarzo, Nicolae Garleanu, Rich Kihlstrom,
Dirk Krueger, George Pennachi, Michael Roberts and participants of seminars, lunches and conference
sessions at Chicago Booth, MIT, Wharton, Univ. of Tokyo, the Minneapolis FED, the New York FED,
the BIRS center on Financial Mathematics, the NBER Summer Institute (2006), and the Western Finance
Association Meetings (2008), for useful comments and discussions. Jianfeng Yu provided exceptional
research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Stavros Panageas. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises
Stavros Panageas




A firm’s termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders
or the firm’s debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee,
firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection.
However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to “walk
away”. I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high
volatility choices, while net worth is high. However, risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm’s net
worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold. Hence, the model reproduces the qualitative
features of existing risk management rules, and can account for phenomena such as “flight to quality”.
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In debating the charter for the Bank of England in 1840, Sir Robert Peel (the Prime Minister
of Britain at the time) used the following words:
While the charter is well-designed and while we are taking all precautions
which legislation can prudently take against the recurrence of a monetary crisis,
a crisis may occur despite of our precautions. If it does, and if it be necessary to
assume grave responsibility for the purpose of meeting it, I dare say men will be
found willing to assume such responsibility.
Sir Robert Peel’s words are as relevant today as they were 168 years ago. As the Unites
States is going through one of the worst ﬁnancial crises of the last decades, and as its leaders
contemplate a large bailout, it seems important to recall that the current crisis is not unique
in its features. During the last few decades, the world has seen several ﬁnancial crises
(Asian crisis, Russian crisis etc.) that all shared a common theme: Periods of increased
risk appetites, as typically evidenced by high leverage ratios, led ﬁnancial institutions to
the brink of bankruptcy. Bailouts and restructuring followed, sometimes undertaken by the
government and sometimes resulting from negotiations between the parties directly involved
in these institutions. At the same time, large liquidations of risky positions - sometimes
referred to as “ﬂight to quality” - exacerbated the initial negative shocks and led to prolonged
periods of depressed asset valuations.
The subprime lending crisis that the United States is experiencing these days provides a
reconﬁrmation of the general pattern: In the years 2004-2006 the quest for higher expected
returns led ﬁnancial institutions to increase their leverage and their lending to subprime
borrowers. The expansion of leverage left little margin for error when house values declined
and delinquencies increased. The initial reaction to the ensuing crisis consisted of private
sector bailouts of the aﬀected entities1 f o l l o w e db yo u t r i g h tg o v e r n m e n tb a i l o u t so n c es o m eo f
1For instance, during the early stages of the recent subprime lending crisis the parent companies of hedge
funds, structure investment vehicles, or originators of CDOs had to provide infusions of liquidity in order
1the largest private entities were considered “too big to fail”. At the same time, risky markets
that attracted several participants between 2004-2006 (such as the market for collateralized
debt obligations) were abandoned in a quite dramatic fashion in favor of simpler and safer
investment forms. This abrupt change in the willingness to take risk led to large risk premia,
illiquidity and deep discounts in several markets, which further exacerbated the crisis.
The commonality of the structure of ﬁnancial crises suggests the possibility of an economic
mechanism that can simultaneously explain their recurrent themes. Two phenomena seem
to be of ﬁrst order importance: a) the pattern of high initial risk taking followed by rapid
reversals of risk appetite around the onset of a crisis and b) the prevalence of bailouts and
restructuring during a crisis.
Pre-existing research has suggested that the ﬁrst phenomenon may have a simple, almost
mechanical explanation: A large body of research has argued2 that it is the very nature of
the risk management practices followed by ﬁnancial institutions that makes them prone to
risk appetite reversals. Indeed, existing risk management rules3 allow high volatility choices
in good times and automatically tighten the risk limits in response to declining market
values. This tends to exacerbate the eﬀects of negative shocks. Then why do such risk
management rules exist in the ﬁrst place ? This question is important both for positive as
well as normative reasons.
The present paper proposes an answer to this question. It develops a model where risk
management rules are derived as optimal responses to the adverse risk taking incentives
created by bailouts. Additionally, the incentives to undertake a bailout are endogenously
determined, making it possible to provide a joint explanation for the observed risk appetite
reversals and the prevalence of bailouts.
to avoid abrupt liquidation of these entities. (For instance Bear Sterns had to bail out two of its hedge
funds at the onset of the crisis). Such guarantees were sometimes explicit (through market value swaps)
and sometimes implicit (due to reputational concerns of the investment banks). See JP Morgan “US Fixed
Income Markets weekly” August 10, 2007 p. 66 for a discussion.
2See e.g. Basak and Shapiro (2001). Papers that are similar in spirit include Grossman and Zhou (1996),
Basak (1995), Pavlova and Rigobon (2005), Gromb and Vayanos (2002).
3One such example is Value at Risk (VAR).
2Speciﬁcally, in the baseline version of the model there are three agents: the ﬁrm’s share-
holders, its debtholders and a stakeholder (such as the parent company of the ﬁrm, an insurer
that guarantees principal repayment to debtholders, junior claimants, potentially the gov-
ernment etc.). The stakeholder incurs a discrete cost or externality if the ﬁrm is terminated.
The presence of this cost or externality makes the stakeholder willing to bail out the ﬁrm, by
injecting funds, once bankruptcy looms. However, the stakeholder’s guarantee to the share-
holders is implicit and the beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s continued presence is bounded. Hence,
bailouts can occur only if the stakeholder ﬁn d si tp r o ﬁtable to undertake them. (The paper
also discusses a variant of the model, where there is no stakeholder and the bankruptcy cost
is incurred directly by the debtholders, who may have an incentive to “forgive” some debt
in order to avoid the discrete bankruptcy cost.)
In this baseline framework, the paper studies the shareholders’ incentive to take risk.
As one might expect, the presence of an implicit guarantee makes the shareholders inclined
to raise the volatility of the projects that they undertake. However, high volatility choices
could deter the stakeholder from bailing out the ﬁrm. This produces a tension. On the one
hand, shareholders want to raise volatility, but not so much that the stakeholder will ﬁnd it
prohibitively costly to bail out the ﬁrm.
In reality, the tension produced by such conﬂicting goals leads to the adoption of regula-
tions, self-regulations, covenants, laws etc. that I will refer to as “risk management rules” or
commitments. Such rules place limits on the risks that ﬁrms can take and hence serve the
purpose of reassuring the stakeholder.
A new aspect of the model is that rules, regulations and commitments are allowed to
be imperfect, as they are likely to be in reality. The imperfection stems from the fact that
future shareholders may choose to renege by paying a cost. This helps capture situations
where ﬁrms can circumvent risk management rules by undertaking costly activities such as
setting up oﬀshore, oﬀ-balance sheet entities etc. The imperfection of commitment implies
that the credibility of a risk management rule is not taken as given. Instead, adherence to
the rule has to be dynamically consistent.
3Within this framework, I analyze the optimal choice of a risk management rule and show
that it has a particularly simple form: undertake projects with high risk levels when net
worth (deﬁned as assets minus liabilities) is suﬃciently high and switch to projects with low
risk levels when net worth falls below an endogenously determined threshold.
The intuition for this result is simple. An optimal risk management rule should induce
the stakeholder to bail out the ﬁrm, in order to avoid the deadweight cost of bankruptcy.
Simultaneously, it should provide future shareholders with high continuation values, in order
to reduce the temptation to renege. The optimal risk management rule achieves both of
these objectives. By tightening the risk limits when net worth is low, it becomes possible
to allow projects with high volatilities when the ﬁrm’s assets safely exceed its liabilities.
By postponing the high volatilities for the times when net worth is high, the anticipated
growth rate of shareholder value is maximized. This “backloading” eﬀect is common in
many dynamic contracting contexts.4
This paper belongs to the continuous time literature that analyzes capital structure via
contingent claim methods. This literature was initiated by the seminal Merton (1974) paper.
Duﬃe (2001) presents a textbook treatment.5 This literature takes the cash ﬂow and control
rights of debt and equity claims as given and uses the risk neutral pricing approach of Cox
and Ross (1976) in a continuous time framework to price claims on a ﬁrm (including implicit
guarantees) by option valuation techniques. The present paper contributes to this literature
by explicitly modeling the incentives of the shareholders to take risk and the incentives of
the stakeholder to undertake a bailout.
Leland (1998) also models endogenous volatility choice. The present paper supports the
results in Leland (1998), in that it shows analytically the optimality of simple Markovian
“bang-bang” type volatility policies. However, the two papers have a diﬀerent focus and
consider diﬀerent frictions and choices, so that the optimal volatility process takes a diﬀerent
form. Speciﬁcally, in Leland (1998) shareholders have an incentive to increase rather than
4See e.g. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006).
5A representative sample of papers in this voluminous literature includes Ronn and Verma (1986), Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Lucas and McDonald (2005), Constanti-
nides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), Pennacchi and Lewis (1994).
4decrease volatility as net worth declines and termination looms.6 The reason is that in
Leland (1998) there are no bailouts or debt renegotiations, so that the terminal nature of
bankruptcy removes the incentives to mitigate risk that are present in this paper. Therefore,
in Leland (1998) the incentives to mitigate risk result from the callability of debt, rather than
the participation constraint of the stakeholder. For parsimony, and in order to illuminate
the new insights of the present paper, I abstract from taxes, callability, and the endogenous
choice of capital structure, so that the only reason to mitigate risk is the participation
constraint of the stakeholder. In such a context the optimal rule is for ﬁrms to increase their
volatility when their net worth is high and reduce it as they come close to bankruptcy, giving
rise to a “ﬂight to quality” phenomenon.
The model is also related to a literature in ﬁnancial economics that studies how commonly
observed risk management practices can lead to variations in institutional risk taking. See
e.g. Grossman and Zhou (1996), Basak (1995) Pavlova and Rigobon (2005), Basak and
Shapiro (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002). Taking these risk management approaches
as given, previous literature has recognized their importance in limiting a ﬁrm’s ability to
absorb risk during times of crisis. The contribution of this paper is to understand why the
prevailing risk management rules dictate risk limits that tighten as ﬁrm’s net worth declines.
There exists a voluminous literature on debt, default and reorganization, that I will
n o ta t t e m p tt os u m m a r i z eh e r e . 7 This literature studies the allocation of control and cash
ﬂow rights, strategic default service, reorganization etc. There are several major diﬀerences
between the present paper and that literature. First of all, for the most part the present
paper studies the incentives to inject “new money” into a company, as opposed to splitting
the existing cash ﬂows. Second, and more importantly, the present paper focuses on the
risk taking and risk management incentives of bailouts. By having an explicit intertemporal
framework, it becomes possible to address the important issue of commitment and rules in
the context of choosing optimal risk management policies.8
6This result holds irrespective of whether one assumes commitment or not.
7See Hart and Moore (1998) for a seminal contribution in this literature.
8See e.g. Leland (1994) on the issue of commitment. In the context of banking, Ritchken, Thompson,
DeGennaro, and Li (1993) show that charter value can create risk management incentives. However, in their
5As Leland (1998) points out, commitment (and the lack thereof) is a central issue behind
the asset substitution problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Recent literature in economic
theory and monetary economics has made advances in terms of making commitment an
endogenous choice rather than imposing it as an assumption.9 In the context of the asset
substitution problem studied in this paper, section 5 introduces a new approach to modeling
commitment and more generally regulations or self-regulations. This approach allows com-
m i t m e n tt h a ti ss o m e w h e r eb e t w e e nt h et w oe x t r e m e so fa )f u l lc o m m i t m e n tw i t h o u ta n y
requirement of time consistency and b) full dynamic consistency which completely precludes
ﬁrms from “tying their hands” through some form of covenant or regulation. The notion
of commitment that is proposed in section 5 allows for the possibility of reneging at a cost.
Therefore, commitment is not perfect, but it is not impossible either.
To endogeneize the extent of commitment, I let the involved parties choose both the risk
management rule and how large will be the cost if the commitment is abandoned. Further-
more, I assume that higher costs of reneging (more stringent regulations or self-regulations)
are associated with higher oppotunity costs associated with distortions, implementation,
monitoring etc..
Surprisingly, it turns out that endogeneizing commitment in this way implies two results:
a) Simple Markovian policies are optimal, since current decisionmakers have an incentive
to choose a commitment, that limits future shareholders’ temptation to renege. b) The
qualitative nature of the optimal risk management rule (high volatility in high net worth
states, low volatility in low net worth states) is not aﬀected by whether the commitment
is imposed as a regulation by the stakeholder or is voluntarily chosen by the shareholders;
only the distribution of the rents from the bailout depends on the party that determines the
volatility policy.
Motivated mostly by the Asian crisis, a literature in international economics consid-
ers the eﬀects of bailouts and balance sheet eﬀects for understanding crises in developing
simpler setup there are no commitment or strategic issues.
9See e.g. Caruana and Einav (2008) for game theoretic applications and Giannoni and Woodford (2002)
for applications to monetary economics.
6economies by taking a general equilibrium perspective.10 Typically, this literature does not
consider the incentives of the parties who undertake the bailout. The present paper takes
a microeconomic approach in order to understand jointly the incentives of stakeholders and
shareholders in a dynamic setting. The conclusions reached in this paper naturally comple-
ment the international ﬁnance literature, which is mostly concerned with general equilibrium
issues. An application of the present model is that levered institutions in developed markets
will rapidly decrease their risky positions in response to negative net worth shocks.11 Such
risk management practices could help explain contagion eﬀects not only across countries but
also across seemingly unrelated markets.12
Methodologically, the paper uses continuous time methods to analyze an intertemporal
incentive problem. Continuous time methods allow a close and explicit characterization of
the solution to dynamic incentive problems. However, the present paper diﬀers with the
dynamic contracting literature,13 since the goal is not to study the optimal design of debt
and equity or the dynamic evolution of a ﬁrm’s capital structure, the allocation of cash ﬂows
etc.. The present paper takes the capital structure as given, and focuses exclusively on the
incentives to take risk and the incentives to undertake bailouts within a dynamic framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the basic model.
In order to expedite the presentation of the main result, Section 3 restricts attention to
Markovian policies and derives the optimal volatility policy in that class assuming the pres-
ence of full commitment. Section 4 presents several realistic extensions of the baseline model
and a discussion of its real world implications. Section 5 introduces the notion of imper-
fect/costly commitment and shows that Markovian commitments are optimal even after
allowing for general (potentially history dependent) commitment policies. Assuming imper-
10See e.g. Schneider and Tornell (2004) and references therein.
11An illustrative example is the behaviour of Japanese banks during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. (See
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001).) It is interesting to note that one of the ﬁnancing forms that most rapidly
evaporated during the East Asian crisis was short term lending by international banks - especially Japanese
and European banks - that provided the bulk of credit lending to these countries. The risk management
practices of these banks coupled with capital adequacy requirements are viewed by many researchers as
responsible for the prolonged capital ﬂow reversal.
12See e.g. Calvo (1999), Caballero and Panageas (2005)
13See e.g. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007),DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006).
7fect/costly commitment, section 6 establishes that the qualitative features of the optimal risk
management rule are the same irrespective of whether the rule is determined by the share-
holders or by the stakeholder through regulation. Finally, section 7 presents the implications
of imperfect/costly commitment for times prior to the ﬁrst bailout. Section 8 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2M o d e l
The baseline model makes a number of simplifying assumptions for expositional reasons.
Several of the simplifying assumptions are relaxed in subsequent sections.
2.1 Lenders and the outside stakeholder
There are three types of agents in the baseline model: a continuum of competitive lenders, a
continuum of anonymous shareholders and an outside stakeholder, who derives some beneﬁt
from the ﬁrm’s continued existence.
The lenders hold a ﬁxed liability of the ﬁrm in the amount L. This liability remains
constant throughout time for simplicity. The ﬁrm also owns assets in the amount Wt, so
that the ﬁrm’s net worth at time t is Wt − L. The assets of the ﬁrm satisfy W0 >Lat time
0.
The ﬁrm is a productive entity that can never fully eliminate the risks associated with
its operation. However, it can choose to invest its assets in projects involving either high
or low risk. Under the risk neutral measure14 both high and low risk projects yield an
expected return equal to the interest rate r per unit of time dt. However, projects involving
high risk have instantaneous volatility σ2, while less risky projects have a lower volatility
0 <σ 1 <σ 2.15 The ﬁrm can costlessly adjust the fraction that it invests in high and low risk
14Roughly speaking, pricing under the risk neutral measure means that the implied Arrow Debreu prices
in the market are used to determine the value of the ﬁrm. For more details on the relationship between
Arrow Debreu prices and risk neutral measures, see Duﬃe (2001).
15The fact that σ1 > 0 implies that the nature of the ﬁrm’s business is such, that it can never fully




= rdt+ σtdZt (1)
where the drift r>0 is the prevailing (real) interest rate in the economy, dZt is a standard
Brownian motion, and σt presents the volatility of total assets. By constantly adjusting
the fraction it invests in high risk and low risk projects, a ﬁr mc a na t t a i na n yl e v e lo f σt ∈
[σ1,σ 2] for all t ≥ 0.
To keep the analysis simple, in the baseline model the ﬁrm can pay no intermediate
dividends to its shareholders until a random time τ,at which time it pays a liquidating divi-
dend in the amount of Wτ −L. Section 4 relaxes this assumption and considers intermediate
dividends. The ﬁrm also pays a ﬂow of rL to its lenders, up to the time of its liquidation.16
Liquidation occurs either exogenously or endogenously. Exogenous liquidation happens
at a random exponentially distributed time τ with constant hazard λ>0. This will facilitate
the use of inﬁnite horizon optimization techniques by making all solutions independent of
time. In addition to this exogenous arrival of termination, lenders can terminate the ﬁrm
prior to τ : By covenant, (or because lending is secured by the assets of the ﬁrm, or is
short term) they can enforce liquidation if the assets of the ﬁrm fall below its liabilities,
i.e. if Wt <L .This assumption and the associated simplicity of the bankruptcy trigger will
expedite the presentation of the results without aﬀecting the conclusions.
When the ﬁrm gets terminated by its lenders (“endogenous liquidation”), the outside
stakeholder incurs a monetary cost B. Purely for simplicity, I assume that this cost does not
arise if liquidation is exogenous.17 T h es o u r c eo ft h ec o s tB typically depends on whether
eliminate risk. For instance, if the ﬁrm is a mortgage granting institution, σ1 > 0 implies that there is
no perfectly safe mortgage. The idea that there is always some risk in a productive entity is a common
assumption in production economies (see e.g. Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)).
16As Leland (1994), I assume that equity issuance can be used to ﬁnance the payments to the debtholders,
as long as shareholder value is positive.
17This assumption can be easily relaxed without aﬀecting any of the results.
9the ﬁrm is non-ﬁnancial or ﬁnancial. For the ﬁrst type of companies, the cost B could have
political origins (e.g. the political cost associated with increased unemployment in a region).
For ﬁnancial companies, the cost B could be interpreted as a ﬁre sale or bankruptcy cost
due to rapid liquidation of the assets. In particular, assume that the outside stakeholder is
an insurer to the lenders and has committed to incur any ﬁre sale or bankruptcy costs in the
event of a liquidation, so that debtholders do not experience any principal losses. In that
case, if the ﬁrm’s assets drop to L and the debtholders force liquidation of the ﬁrm, there
will be bankruptcy and ﬁre sale costs in the amount of B, that the stakeholder will have to
incur.18A further interpretation of B as an externality occurs when a ﬁrm has claimants of
diﬀerent seniority that could be hit asymmetrically by bankruptcy costs.19 B could also be
the result of systemic risk, or it could have reputational origins. For instance, at the onset
of the recent subprime lending crisis, several major investment banks bailed out structure
investment vehicles or hedge funds they were sponsoring, so as to shield their claimholders
from losing their invested capital.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that even though the assumption of a discrete
bankruptcy cost or externality B is critical for the results, the assumption about the existence
of an outside stakeholder isn’t. Section 4.1 presents a variant of the basic model where it is
the debtholders who incur the cost B rather than some outside stakeholder.
Whatever the reason for the cost or externality B, the outside stakeholder has the option
of making transfers to the ﬁrm in order to keep its assets above L, and hence prevent
liquidation by the lenders. In mathematical terms
dWt = rWtdt + σtWtdZt + dGt (2)
18For instance, a standard practice of major investment banks was to provide their structured investment
vehicles (SIV’s) with a guarantee to purchase their short term paper at ﬁxed rates, if the need presented
itself. Economically this is identical to providing a guarantee to the debtholders of the fund. Similarly, the
deposit insurance agency of a given country might have to incur such bankruptcy costs in order to protect
the bank’s lenders.
19As an example, consider a ﬁrm that has debt in the amount L = LS +LJ, whrere LS is senior debt and
LJ is junior debt. If there are bankruptcy costs in the amount B ≤ LJ and senior debtholders can request
liquidation once the ﬁrm’s assets reach L, then they can impose an externality on junior debtholders by
requesting liquidation.
10where dGt ≥ 0 represents incremental transfers that can be used once Wt = L in order to
enforce Wt ≥ L for all t. Intuitively, one should think of these injections as follows: Each
time the ﬁrm’s assets Wt fall by an amount ε>0 below L, the stakeholder transfers ε to the
ﬁrm. Since the stakeholder has no incentive to make transfers to the ﬁrm beyond the ones
that are absolutely necessary to ensure its existence, one can focus on the minimal process
that is required to keep Wt >L .Karatzas and Shreve (1991) (p.210-211) show that the
























In the baseline model the stakeholder injects funds without receiving a share of the ﬁrm’s
dividends (or other form of security) in exchange for the transfers Gt. Section 4 enriches the
model to allow for this realistic extension.
A key assumption of the model is that the stakeholder has a choice on whether to bail
out the ﬁrm or not. In particular, once the assets of the ﬁrm become equal to its liabilities,
the stakeholder can decide whether to make the transfers dGt or to just let the lenders seize
the assets and terminate the ﬁrm.
Deﬁning τl to be the time of ﬁrm liquidation (be it exogenous or lender-induced), a
suﬃcient condition for the stakeholdert oa l w a y sp r e f e rt ob a i lo u tt h eﬁrm is that the net









where the process Gt is given by (3). The expectation is taken under the risk neutral
measure, and so are all expectations in the rest of the paper. Since the ﬁrm controls the
volatility process σt, it also inﬂuences the net present value of the transfers on the left hand
side of this equation.
112.2 Shareholders
The volatility choices of the ﬁrm are determined by its shareholders. Therefore, I use the
terms “the ﬁrm” and “the shareholders” interchangeably.
To determine the value of the ﬁrm to shareholders, observe that the total value of the
ﬁrm is given by Wt + Pt, where Pt is the value of the implicit option that the stakeholder








T h et o t a lv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm is just equal to the sum of the claims that debtholders and
shareholders hold. Letting Vt denote shareholder value and Dt denote debtholder value, one
obtains Wt + Pt = Vt + Dt. Since debtholders can always induce liquidation once Wt = L,
they hold eﬀectively riskless debt. Accordingly Dt = L. Using this observation, shareholder
value is
V (Wt)=Wt − L + Pt (6)
Equation (6) has two implications. First, diﬀerent volatility processes will aﬀect share-
holder value through their eﬀect on the value of the guarantee Pt. Since Pt ≥ 0, shareholders
always have an incentive to induce the stakeholder to extend the guarantee once Wt = L.
To check intuition, it is also useful to conﬁrm that the ﬁrm has an incentive to set
high levels of volatility in order to exploit the guarantee provided by the stakeholder. To
be more speciﬁc, ignoring temporarily the constraint (4) and assuming that the stakeholder
unconditionally guarantees the perpetual continuation of the ﬁrm until the time of exogenous
termination, the following result holds:
Lemma 1 Assume that τl = τ in expression (5). Assume furthermore that volatility is








+2 σ2 (r + λ)
σ2 < 0 (7)









It is also straightforward to show the following result
Lemma 2 Assume that τl = τ in expression (5). Then the volatility choice that maximizes
Pt is given by σt = σ2.
In light of the above result, if the stakeholder extended an unconditional and perpetual
guarantee to the ﬁrm, then the shareholder value maximizing choice of volatility would be to
set σt equal to its upper bound σ2 for all t>0. This captures the standard asset substitution
intuition of unconditional guarantees.
The above two Lemmas only apply if the guarantee is unconditional. The focus of this
paper, however, is on guarantees that are implicit, i.e. guarantees that will only be extended








= P (L;σ2) (9)
I nl i g h to fL e m m a1a n de q u a t i o n( 4 ) ,a s s u m p t i o n1h a st w oi m p l i c a t i o n s :a )t oe n s u r e
that the ﬁr mh a sa tl e a s to n ef e a s i b l ec h o i c eo fv o l a t i l i t yt h a tw i l lm a k ei tp o s s i b l et os a t i s f y
the constraint (4) (namely by setting σt = σ1) and b) to impose that setting volatility equal
to the upper bound σ2 for all t>0 will violate the constraint (4).
I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,B is a time invariant constant that satisﬁes assumption 1. Preview-
ing results, this will imply that optimal volatility choices will always induce the stakeholder
13to bail out the ﬁrm. Section 4.3 presents a simple example where B is time-varying and
shows that termination can occur in equilibrium.
2.3 Commitment and risk management rules
The above discussion illustrates the tension that is at the core of this paper. On the one
hand, shareholders would like to set high volatility levels in order to increase the value of the
implicit guarantee. On the other hand, if volatility choices are too large, then it will become
too expensive for the stakeholder to extend the guarantee.
To resolve this tension, I introduce commitment via some form of regulation that I will
refer as a “risk management rule”. Commitment serves the purpose of reassuring the stake-
holder that the ﬁrm will not exploit the implicit protection.
To expedite the presentation of the key results, this section makes several simplifying
assumptions: Speciﬁcally, once the ﬁrm is started shareholders have the ability to pre-
commit costlessly and perfectly as to how future volatility will be determined. Furthermore,
shareholders can only formulate Markovian commitments, i.e. the promised volatility choice
depends exclusively on the state variable Wt. Finally, the risk management rule is determined
in a shareholder-value maximizing way.
Section 5 relaxes all these simplifying assumptions by allowing arbitrary adapted policies
(i.e. not necessarily Markovian policies). Furthermore, that section allows for the possibility
of imperfect and costly commitment, in the sense that the risk management rule can be
circumvented at a cost. Section 6 discusses the case where the stakeholder can impose the
risk management rule on the shareholders via regulation or law. The main result of sections
5 and 6 is that the features of the optimal risk management rule are not altered by these
extensions.
In light of the simplifying assumptions introduced in the present section, determining the
optimal risk management rule amounts to solving the following problem.
Problem 1 Let M denote the class of Markovian policies, i.e. policies of the form σt =




subject to the constraint
P(L) ≤ B. (11)
In light of (6) maximizing P (Wt;σ) is equivalent to maximizing shareholder value. Hence,
the objective (10) is the familiar shareholder value maximization objective, while (11) simply
re-states the stakeholder’s participation constraint (4) taking into account that the Markov-
ian nature of the volatility policies makes Pt also Markovian.
3S o l u t i o n
3.1 The set of feasible payoﬀs
The ﬁrst step towards solving problem 1 is to characterize the set of payoﬀ functions P(W)
that can be attained by σ(W) ∈ M, while also satisfying (11). This is the purpose of the
next Lemma.
Lemma 3 Let the payoﬀ function P be deﬁned as in (5), and assume that it satisﬁes con-
straint (11). Then the following results hold for any σ(W) ∈ M :




2PWW + rPWW − (r + λ)P =0 (12)
2. P is within the bounds 0 ≤ P (W) ≤ B for all W ∈ [L,∞). At +∞ the function P
satisﬁes limW→∞ P(W)=0
153. P ∈ C1 and the derivatives of P satisfy PW(L)=−1,P W < 0,P WW > 0.
Lemma 3 states several properties of any feasible payoﬀ function. The ﬁrst property
is a familiar Black-Scholes type diﬀerential equation. Heuristically, it can be derived by
observing that Pt is a “claim” whose rate of appreciation in the domain [L,∞) is equal to
the sum of the interest rate r and the hazard rate of termination λ
dE (Pt)
dt
=( r + λ)Pt (13)
Using Ito’s Lemma,
dE(Pt)
dt can be expressed as
σ2(W)
2 W2PWW +rPWW. Combining Ito’s
Lemma with (13) leads to (12).
Property 2 in Lemma 3 places upper and lower bounds on the set of feasible payoﬀs.20
Property 3 has a somewhat more intricate proof, which is given in the appendix. It is however
straightforward to give a heuristic intuition for PW(L)=−1. Consider a situation where the
assets of the ﬁrm fall below L by a small amount ε. Assuming participation compatibility,
the stakeholder will intervene in order to restore the assets back to L b ym a k i n gat r a n s f e ro f
ε. Therefore, it is as if the “claim” P pays a “dividend” ε and the state variable W is reset
back to L. Therefore P(L − ε)=ε + P(L). Expanding the left hand side of this equation
in a Taylor fashion around L gives P(L) − εPW(L)=ε + P(L). Cancelling P(L) from both
sides and dividing by ε gives PW(L)=−1.
20To see why P will always be between those two bounds, ﬁxat ≥ τ0 and let τL be the ﬁrst time (after










The ﬁrst equality in (14) follows from dGs =0for all s ∈ [t,τL] .T h eﬁrst inequality in (14) follows by
constraint (11) and the second inequality follows since e−(r+λ)(τL−t) ≤ 1.
163.2 The optimization problem as a regular optimal control prob-
lem






1{x<W t} is an indicator function taking the value 1 if x<W t and 0 otherwise. Assuming
that the participation constraint binds, P(L)=B.(Lemma 6 in section 5 veriﬁes that this
constraint optimally binds). Furthermore, using the characterization of all attainable payoﬀs
from Lemma 3, one can rewrite the optimization problem 1 as a standard (deterministic)







































Equation (16) is simply a transformation of the second order equation (12) into a system
of two ﬁrst order ordinary diﬀerential equations, while equation (17) gives the boundary
conditions of the state variables (P,P0) at L and ∞.
Letting π1,π 2 denote the co-state variables for the two state variables (P,P0), the Hamil-
tonian for this optimal control problem is











T h ef a c tt h a tP00 > 0 (by Lemma 3) implies that ((r + λ)P(x) 1
x2 − rP0(x)1
x) > 0 (by [12]).




σ1 if π2 > 0
σ2 if π2 < 0
(19)
By standard optimal control theory, the co-state variables must satisfy:













The form of (19) suggests that the optimal policy will have a “bang-bang” form, with a
switch at the point W∗ where π2 changes sign. Motivated by this observation, a reasonable




σ1 if x<W ∗
σ2 if x ≥ W∗ (22)
for an appropriately chosen constant W∗. The next Lemma uses policy (22) to determine
a closed form solution for P (Wt;σ∗) taking an arbitrary W∗ ≥ L as given. It then determines
W∗ in such a way as to satisfy the boundary condition P(L;σ∗)=B. In a ﬁnal step,
Proposition 1 veriﬁes that (22) solves (19), and hence is optimal.
Lemma 4 Take an arbitrary W∗ >Land suppose that shareholders adopt policy σ∗ of








































































































































































Lemma 4 determines the appropriate value of W∗, that makes the policy of equation (22)
satisfy (11). The appendix solves the diﬀerential equations (20), (21), and conﬁrms that
this policy also satisﬁes (19). It becomes then straightforward to establish the optimality of
policy σ∗
t :
Proposition 1 Let σ∗
t be deﬁned as in (22) with W∗ given by (25). Then
P (Wt;σ
∗
t) ≥ P (Wt;σt)
for any volatility policy σt ∈ M and for any Wt ≥ L. The inequality becomes an equality if
σt = σ∗
t.
This proposition implies that the ﬁrm will always follow a simple policy: keep volatility
at the lower bound σ1 while Wt ≤ W∗, and then switch to maximal volatility σ2 if current
assets Wt exceed W∗. The critical wealth level W∗ is determined in such a way as to make
the key constraint (11) hold as an equality.
Why is it optimal for the ﬁrm to lower, instead of raise volatility as its net worth declines
? To see intuitively why, let τ0 be a time when Wτ0 = L, ﬁxal e v e lW1 >Land let τ1 be



























The rightmost expression of equation (26) gives an upper bound to the continuation
v a l u et h a tc a nb ea s s i g n e da tt i m eτ1. It is possible to show that the solution to the two
minimization problems of equation (26) is obtained by setting σs∈[τ0,τ1] = σ1. This is intuitive:
By setting volatility at the lowest level between τ0 and τ1, it becomes possible to obtain the
highest possible guarantee value at time τ1, while still satisfying (4). Of course, after a
certain point, the optimal risk management rule needs to switch to high levels of volatility
in order to “deliver” on these high continuation values to the shareholders.
Proposition 1 is the main result of the paper. It illustrates that the optimal risk manage-
ment rule is to set high volatilities when the ﬁrm is doing well (in the sense that it has a high
net worth) and reduce volatility when the ﬁrm’s net worth declines. The rest of the paper
studies how general is this conclusion. The next section describes variations and extensions
of the baseline model, that take into account the many forms that real-world bailouts take.
Section 5 introduces costly and imperfect commitment and shows that Markovian policies
are optimal. The last two sections develop implications of costly and imperfect commitment.
Section 6 discusses cases, where the stakeholder has all the bargaining power and can impose
the risk management rule via law or regulation, while Section 7 discusses implications of the
model for times prior to the ﬁrst bailout.
204 Extensions and Discussion
4.1 Absence of a stakeholder and debt forgiveness
It seems reasonable to ask if the model’s predictions carry through even in cases where no
stakeholder is present. To answer this question, this subsection discusses a simple model with
only shareholders and debtholders. It is possible to show in a simple and stylized variant of
the previous model that optimal principal writedowns can produce eﬀects that are similar
to bailouts.21
Speciﬁcally, this subsection keeps all the assumptions made sofar with the exceptions
that 1) there is no stakeholder and hence dGs =0 , 2) endogenous liquidation makes the
ﬁrm’s assets instantaneously decline by a fraction b<1, i.e. Wτ+ =( 1− b)Wτ−, and most
importantly 3) whenever Wτ <L τ the debtholders either have the option to declare the ﬁrm
bankrupt and obtain its assets that are worth (1 − b)Wτ ,o rt h e yc a nf o r g i v ed e b t∆Lτ < 0
so as to ensure that Lτ + ∆Lτ = Wτ. Under these assumptions, if a ﬁrm has survived by
time t, it means that Lt is given by
Lt =m i n {L0, min
0≤s≤t
Ws}.
A suﬃcient condition to induce debtholders to always prefer to write down principal is
that for every time τ such that Wτ = Lτ, the value of a bankrupt ﬁrm is less than the
anticipated present value of interest and principal payments. Mathematically,









for all τ : Wτ = Lτ (27)
Applying integration by parts on the right hand side of (27), using the fact that Wτ = Lτ,
21For a rich and tractable model that studies allocation of cash ﬂows and strategic debt service within a
dynamic valuation framework, see Anderson and Sundaresan (1996). Sundaresan and Wang (2007) study
strategic debt service in the presence of real options.





−r(s−τ)dLs ≤ bLτ. (28)
Notice that (28) has a form that is quite similar to (4) except that dGs is replaced by
−dLs (recall that dLs < 0) and the right hand side is proportional to Lτ.








−r(τL−t) (WτL − LτL)
i
= Wt−Lt+ b P(Wt,L t)
where b P(Wt,L t) is deﬁned as





Assuming that one can constrain attention to volatility policies that set σt as a function of
the asset to liability ratio wt ≡ Wt
Lt , then the following analog of Lemma 3 obtains.
Lemma 5 Let the payoﬀ function b P be deﬁned as in (29), and assume that it satisﬁes (28).
Then the following results hold for any σ(wt)
1. There exists a function p(wt) such that b P(Wt,L t)=Ltp(wt). In the domain (1,∞),




2pww + rpww − (r + λ)p =0
2. p is within the bounds 0 ≤ p(w) ≤ b for all w ∈ [1,∞). At +∞ the function p satisﬁes
limw→∞ p(w)=0 .
3. p ∈ C1 and the derivatives of p satisfy pw(1) = −1+p(1),p w < 0,p ww > 0.
22The proof of this Lemma is practically identical to the proof of Lemma 3 and is therefore
omitted.22
Given the similarity between the characteristics of feasible payoﬀso fL e m m a3a n dL e m m a











and repeating the same logic of section 3, one obtains that the optimal policy is given by
σ
∗(x)=








































Notice that the optimal policy has the same familiar form as before: choose high volatilities
when the asset to liability ratio is high and switch to low volatilities when the asset to
liability ratio is low.
In summary, this section showed that the assumption of a stakeholder is not crucial for
the key results. All that is required is a discrete drop in the value of assets upon bankruptcy.
Of course in reality debt renegotiations are much more complex than outright principal
writedowns. In most cases the existing debt is exchanged for some other claim (for instance
some debt with alternative terms, equity etc.) The next subsection discusses such cases.
22The only part that requires some explanation is the fact pw = −1+p(1). This follows from the fact
that when Wt declines below Lt by a small ε we obtain b P(Lt − ε,Lt)=ε + b P(Lt − ε,Lt − ε). (This follows
because once Wt becomes smaller than L by ε>0, the assets Wt don’t change but Lt is reset downward by
ε.) Taking a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion leads to b P(Lt−ε,Lt)=b P(Lt−ε,Lt−ε)+εb PL(Lt−ε,Lt−ε)+o(ε)
where
o(ε)
ε → 0 as ε → 0. Combining the last two equations gives εb PL(Lt −ε,Lt −ε)+o(ε)=ε. Dividing by
ε and sending ε → 0 leads to b PL (Lt,L t)=1 . Since b P(Wt,L t)=Ltp(wt),a n dwt = Wt
Lt it follows at once
that b PL(Lt,L t)=p(1) − p0(1) and therefore pw(1) = −1+p(1). Since any optimal policy should make the
constraint (28) binding, it follows that p(1) = b and pw (1) = −1+b.
234.2 Bailouts and Security Issuance
In the baseline model bailouts have taken the form of direct transfers. In reality, the stake-
holder undertaking the bailout often obtains some form of security in exchange for injecting
funds. To have a simple example, return to the baseline model and suppose that the ﬁrst
time that Wt = L, the ﬁrm gives the stakeholder a claim to a share x<1 of the ﬁrm’s liqui-
dating dividends in exchange for receiving the transfer process Gt as described by equation
(3).
Since the shareholder value of the ﬁrm is given by (6), and Wt = L, t h et o t a lv a l u eo ft h e
ﬁrm (including the newly issued shares) is Pt. By obtaining a fraction x of the ﬁrm’s shares,









More importantly, even though the value of the ﬁrm to the original shareholders is now
xPt, the same volatility commitments that maximize Pt will maximize xPt, and all the
analysis of the paper can be repeated after replacing the constraint (4) with (30).
An alternative way to think about equation (30) is as follows: Through the bailouts, the
stakeholder “pays” an amount Pt (this is the net present value of the transfers) to purchase
shares that are worth (1 − x)Pt. Hence, she eﬀectively purchases over-priced shares, which
results in a net transfer to the original shareholders. Whether the transfer takes the form of
outright cash injections, or purchases of “over-priced” shares has no material consequence
for the analysis.
It should also be clear that the above argument does not depend on the type of claim
that stakeholders obtain. As long as a) the ﬁrm survives once Wt = L, b) the shareholder
retains some non-zero cash ﬂow rights on the liquidating dividend, and c) the debtholder gets
repaid capital and interest in all states of the world, then the stakeholder must be purchasing
overpriced securities.
24Even though the argument of this subsection was developed in the context of the baseline
model, it carries over also to the case of principal writedowns (section 4.1). In particular,
the conclusions of this section also apply to the setups, where the debtholders write down
principal in exchange for obtaining equity - a common outcome of renegotiations to avoid
bankruptcy.
Finally, a practical implication of allowing security issuance during a bailout is that the
guarantee-extending party can even gain from a bailout ex-post, even though ex-ante the
bailout is not proﬁtable.
4.3 Temporary Externalities
Realistically, it is sometimes observed that ﬁr m sw i n dd o w na f t e rb e i n gb a i l e do u t . T h e
present framework allows for this, if one assumes that externalities are temporary. In reality,
one motivation for bailouts is that there is a temporary shortage of liquidity in the market
that could produce large termination costs B. With the passage of time however, and with
active search for buyers for the ﬁrm’s assets, these costs could be eliminated.
To model such a situation in the simplest possible way, suppose that after bailing out
a ﬁrm (i.e. the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tWt = L), the stakeholder can start a project to reduce the
termination cost B (such as searching for an appropriate buyer for the ﬁrm’s assets). This
project has a constant hazard rate of success β. However, if the project succeeds, it can
reduce the externality from B down to 0.23




2PWW + rPWW − (r + λ + β)P =0 . (31)
Equation (31) asserts that once the stakeholder starts her eﬀorts to eliminate the exter-
nality, the overall hazard rate of guarantee termination is λ + β. This stylized setup shows
23The results also go through when B drops to a level smaller than L
|α(σ1)|, because then assumption 1 is
violated.
25that if bailouts are associated with active eﬀorts by the stakeholder to reduce the externality
produced by the ﬁrm, then one should expect that bailouts will be temporary phenomena.
4.4 Bailouts through mergers and acquisitions
Especially in government sponsored bailouts, there is pressure for the government to not
bailout the existing shareholders for reasons of “fairness”. However, in many such cases
the government may still try to salvage the company by ﬁnding a buyer, who acquires the
company with all of its assets and its liabilities. In such a situation the government and the
buyer typically enter negotiations. The joint surplus that the government and the buyer can
obtain is B, i.e. the cost of liquidating the ﬁrm. In these negotiations the government may
agree (implicitly or explicitly) to provide transfers to the buyer in order to incentivize him or
her to acquire the company24 and the buyer will have an incentive to give a volatility promise
that satisﬁes the constraint (4). From this point on, one can simply repeat the analysis of
the baseline version of the model. Furthermore, if political redistribution concerns imply
that the amount of time that the new shareholders can enjoy the government’s protection is
exponentially distributed with parameter β, then the model from the perspective of the new
buyer becomes formally equivalent to the model of temporary externalities of the subsection
4.3.25
In summary, the model’s qualitative predictions do not depend on whether it is the
existing shareholders or the new buyers who enter the volatility management commitment.
A sl o n ga st h e r ei sas u r p l u st ob eh a d ,n e g o t i a t i o n sb e t w e e nt h eg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h ea c q u i r o r
will give the acquiror the incentives to enter a volatility commitment. (See also section 6 for
the case where the government has some bargaining power.)
4.5 Intermediate Dividends
24For instance in the recent bailout of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan, the government agreed to provide a
muti-billion dollar credit line to JP Morgan in order to provide incentives for the acquisition.
25One can extend the model in a straightforward way to allow for repeated purchases of the company
by newly arriving buyers, once the “grace” period of past buyers has elapsed and the company is about to
become bankrupt again.
26Finally, the assumption that the ﬁrm only distributes a terminal dividend can easily be
relaxed. Speciﬁcally, assume that the ﬁrm distributes a constant fraction δ of its assets as
dividends to shareholders. In this case, equation (2) becomes
dWt =( r − δ)Wtdt + σtWtdZt + dGt.
The expression for shareholder value, however, is still given by (6). The reason is that
t h et o t a lv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm is still given by Wt + Pt and the claim of the debtholders is still




2PWW +( r − δ)PWW − (r + λ)P =0 .
Accordingly, letting e r = r−δ and e λ = λ+δ, all the expressions obtained in Lemma 4 and
Proposition 1 continue to apply in the presence of intermediate dividends with e r replacing r
and e λ replacing λ.26
5 Imperfect and Costly commitment
So far, the paper has only considered Markovian policies. A voluminous literature restricts
attention to Markovian policies on a priori informational grounds.27 However, a more impor-
tant reason why the analysis sofar has focused attention on such policies, is that Markovian
policies turn out to be optimal in the space of all (possibly history-dependent) policies as
long as commitment is imperfect and costly rather than perfect and costless.
To introduce the notion of imperfect and costly commitment, let τ0 be the ﬁrst time that
26A more complex issue, that is beyond the scope of this paper, arises if dividends are assumed to be
endogenous. Then the shareholders have an incentive to distribute excessive dividends in order to maximize
the value of the guarantee. In that case the optimal commitment to the stakeholder needs to include
provisions not only about volatility choice, but about dividend distribution as well.
27See e.g. Chapter 13 in the textbook of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a list of papers that restrict
player’s actions to be Markovian. In the case where the players are ﬁrms, this restriction to “memory-less”
strategies is routinely motivated by the fact that ﬁrms -unlike individuals- are run by continuously changing
managers who may not have full access to the past history. However, they do know the current state variables.
27Wτ0 = L, so that the stakeholder needs to form a view as to how the ﬁrm will set volatility in
the future. Importantly, from this point onward shareholders will be able to choose arbitrary
adapted volatility policies.
In reality, commitment is likely to be imperfect and costly. To model these notions,
I assume that any risk management rule can be circumvented (i.e. abandoned) by future
shareholders at a cost I>0. For instance, in a world of imperfect accounting, shareholders
can pay a cost and create legal entities or invest in oﬀ-balance sheet items that make it hard
to assess the value of the ﬁrm’s assets, thus allowing them to take extra risk.
To endogeneize the extent of commitment, I assume that the parties currently involved
in the formulation of a risk management rule can choose ex-ante the penalty I that future
shareholders will have to pay if they choose to deviate. In most real-world examples such a
choice is achieved by restricting the ﬁrm’s ability to invest in certain instruments. As already
noted, such restrictions can be circumvented -say by creating new legal entities. However, by
making the restrictions more stringent, the cost of circumventing them is likely to become
higher. In that sense, by making the restrictions more stringent, the current shareholders
and stakeholders can choose how costly it will be to circumvent the risk management rule.
Clearly, the higher I, the more credible any risk management rule will become. However,
it also seems plausible that rules that impose a high I may have other unintended distortions:
For instance, by making it very costly for a ﬁrm to engage in certain types of transactions
(such as derivatives, oﬀ-balance sheet and oﬀ-shore transactions) it also becomes hard for
the ﬁrm to use these instruments for tax-planning or risk sharing. To capture the idea
that more “draconian” commitment devices lead to more distortions, I assume that if future
shareholders’ cost of reneging is set to some level I, then current shareholders will incur a
monetary deadweight cost equal to kI, where k ∈ (0,1). This is the “implementation cost”
associated with the risk management rule.
A novel implication of this setup is that since commitment is costly, both the rules and
the cost of reneging are jointly and endogenously determined. Diﬀerent choices of I between
0 and inﬁnity span the spectrum between no commitment and limitless commitment.
28The deﬁnitions that follow formalize the notions described above. In this section, share-
holders have all the bargaining power and hence can choose both the risk management rule
and the penalties associated with deviation (self-regulation). The next section discusses the
opposite case, whereby the stakeholders can impose both the risk management rule and the
penalties via law or regulation.
In the following deﬁnitions, the notation σs>t refers to the volatility process that is
adopted after time t. Importantly, σs>t can be an arbitrary adapted process (i.e. not neces-
sarily Markovian).
Deﬁnition 1 Let τL be any time such that WτL = L. Then a volatility process σs is partic-
ipation compatible if
P (L;σs≥τL) ≤ B (32)
Clearly, a stakeholder will never agree to bail out a ﬁrm at time τL unless constraint (32)
is satisﬁed. The next deﬁnition captures the idea of commitment credibility.
Deﬁnition 2 Let τ0 be the time at which the commitment is entered. Fix a t>τ 0 and let
χ be the ﬁrst time after t, such that Wχ = L. For a given level of I, a volatility process σs≥τ0
is credible if for all t and Wt










and σs≥χ is participation compatible.
Deﬁnition 2 captures the simple notion that the value of the guarantee under commitment
and/or the cost I should always be large enough, so that future shareholders will not ﬁnd
it optimal to pay the cost I and then reset the volatility from that point on. The term
inside square brackets is the value that the shareholder can obtain by re-entering a new
p r o m i s ea ts o m ef u t u r et i m eχ>t , at which time the shareholders and the stakeholder will
29have to contemplate a new bailout. The term supσs∈(t,χ) Ee−(r+λ)(χ−t) captures the idea that
shareholders can choose volatility freely between t and χ, if they choose to renege.
Deﬁnition 2 implies that for any given volatility process σs≥t, there exists a minimal
amount b I (σs≥t) that will make that volatility process credible.28
With all these deﬁnitions in hand, it is now possible to give the deﬁnition of an optimal
volatility process.
Deﬁnition 3 Let b I (σ)=m i n I ∈ [0,∞) such that σs≥τ0 is credible. A volatility process
σ∗













≥ P (L;σs≥τ0) − kb I (σs≥τ0) (34)
for any other participation compatible σs≥τ0.
According to this deﬁnition, a process σ∗
s≥τ0 is optimal if it is participation compatible
and maximizes the value of the implicit guarantee net of the costs that are required to ensure
its credibility.
It will be useful at this stage to make a conjecture, that is veriﬁed later. Let τL denote




In particular the conjecture (35) applies to time τ0.
Given conjecture (35), the search for the optimal commitment σ∗
s≥τ0 amounts to min-
imizing b I (σs≥τ0) over all policies that satisfy (35). Intuitively, shareholders would like to
put the stakeholder against her participation constraint, while keeping the implementation
cost kb I (σs≥τ0) as low as possible. An additional implication of (35) is that equation (33)
28Since the volatilities are bounded, both the left hand side and the second term on the right hand side
are bounded.
30becomes
P (Wt;σs≥t) ≥ [B − kI]s u p
σs∈(t,χ)
Ee






The rightmost equality of (36) asserts that once shareholders renege, they will set volatil-
ity to the highest possible level, until they have to negotiate with the stakeholder again.29
Given this constant volatility choice, the expression Ee−(r+λ)(χ−t) has a simple closed form
expression30 given by (Wt/L)
α(σ2) .
Re-arranging equation (36) and recognizing that b I will have to be determined so that
(36) holds at all times and for all levels of Wt gives












Under conjecture (35), the aim of the shareholders is to choose a volatility process that will
minimize b I, while satisfying (35).
Equation (37) implies that b I is a decreasing function of the continuation values P (Wt;σs≥t).
Between two participation compatible commitments, the one that implies higher continua-
tion values at each point in time, will be preferred since shareholders in the future will be
less tempted to renege. Accordingly, b I will be lower.
An important implication of (37) is that shareholders at two times t1 and t2 such that
Wt1 = Wt2 are treated symmetrically; equation (37) implies that it is only min(Pt1,P t2) that
matters for the determination of b I (σs≥τ0),w h e t h e rt1 <t 2 or t2 >t 1. This time invariance
makes Markovian policies (that set by deﬁnition Pt1 = Pt2) optimal. Formally, this is shown
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 For any (potentially non-Markovian) participation compatible policy σ,
there exists a lower bound b I∗, such that b I∗ ≤ b I(σ). Finally, for the Markovian policy σ∗
29The proof of this fact follows the same steps as Lemma 2 and is omitted.
30See Øksendal (2003), p. 217.
31of equation (22), one obtains b I∗ = b I(σ∗).
Proposition 2 shows that the policy of equation (22) is optimal, since it attains the lower
bound b I∗, while satisfying the constraint (35).3132
The last step is to verify the conjecture (35).
Lemma 6 It is always optimal for constraint (32) to hold as an equality.
6 Allocation of bargaining power
In several realistic situations risk management rules are imposed by the stakeholder via
regulation. Assuming costly commitment, this section shows that the distinction between
regulation and self-regulation aﬀects the rents of the two parties, but not the qualitative
features of the optimal rule.
To be precise, suppose that the shareholders of the ﬁrm have some outside option when
Wτ = L. Such an outside option could be the result of legal diﬃculties in enforcing absolute
priority, or more simply it could result from some scarce expertise that the shareholders can
use elsewhere if the ﬁrm gets liquidated. Whatever the source, suppose that the monetary
value of this outside option is e v ∈ (P (L;σ1),B). Since shareholders can always “walk away”
31An implication of Proposition 2 is that there exists a minimum amount of b I∗, that needs to be paid in
order to insure the credibility of any participation compatible policy. A corollary of Proposition 2 that can
be proven in a similar way, is that it is impossible to ﬁnd any participation compatible strategy unless the
ﬁrm pays at least b I∗. From a practical perspective this shows that the conclusions of the model are robust
to how exactly one models credibility. Speciﬁcally, deﬁnition 2 requires that a commitment be credible at
all states and dates. This assumption may seem too strong at ﬁrst. However, the above argument implies
that participation compatibility alone and by itself places a lower bound on I. The reason is intuitive. If I is
not large enough, then the stakeholder anticipates that the shareholders will renege, which in turn increases
the stakeholder’s cost and makes it harder to satisfy the constraint (32). Hence, as long as one requires
the rather unobjectionable property of participation compatibility, the proposed policy of this paper will be
optimal.
32Proposition 2 does not assert that σ∗ is the unique policy that attains the lower bound b I∗. However, it
does assert that no other participation compatible (potentially non-Markovian) policy can improve on the
markovian policy σ∗.
32with e v,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
P(L;σ) − kb I(σ) ≥ e v (38)
Now suppose that the stakeholder can determine the risk management rule and the associated
punishments. Since the stakeholder is trying to minimize the value of the implicit guarantee,
the stakeholder has an incentive to impose a risk management rule that will make equation
(38) hold as an equality. However, as long as the assumptions of section 5 still hold, and
shareholders could deviate from the prescribed policy at some cost I,then the optimal policy
that minimizes P(L;σ) is the one that minimizes the implementation cost kb I(σ). To see this,
note that since (38) has to hold as an equality it follows that P(L;σ)=e v + kb I(σ) for any
policy and hence minσ P(L;σ)=e v+kminσ b I(σ). ( I ts h o u l da l s ob en o t e dh e r e ,t h a ti td o e s n ’ t
matter if the implementation cost kb I(σ) is “levied” on the shareholders or the stakeholder,
since it simply reduces the joint surplus.)
From this point on, the entire analysis of the paper is applicable, with the only exception
that the binding constraint P(L)=e v + kb I(σ) replaces the binding constraint (35). Since
the optimal policy has always the same qualitative form irrespective of the value of P(L),
it follows that the optimal risk management rule remains qualitatively intact: choose low
values of σ1 when Wt is lower than some threshold, and choose σ2 when Wt is above that
threshold. However, the exact magnitude of the threshold, and hence the distribution of
rents, does depend on whether it is the stakeholder or the shareholders that choose the
optimal risk management rule.
I ns u m m a r y ,t h eq u a l i t a t i v ef e a t u r e so ft h eo p t i m a lr u l ea r ei n v a r i a n tw i t hr e s p e c tt o
the party that chooses the rule. Be it through regulation or self-regulation, an optimal rule
should “tempt” future shareholders as little as possible. By choosing a rule that postpones
the high volatilities for times when net worth is high, the anticipated growth rate of the value
of the guarantee is maximized. In turn, this reduces the temptation of future shareholders
to circumvent the risk management rule, which results in smaller required punishments b I(σ)
and smaller distortions kb I(σ).
337 The implications of the model for t<τ 0
In section 5, the discussion focused on risk management rules that are imposed at τ0, the
time at which the ﬁrm may be threatened with bankruptcy. However, risk management rules
are likely to take eﬀect already at time t<τ 0.
To give an example suppose that at time 0 shareholders have the ability to start a ﬁrm by
making an equity contribution equal to W0−L. If started, the ﬁrm will produce a total gain
equal to v0 to the shareholder and U0 to the stakeholder. For instance, if the stakeholder is
the government, the new ﬁrm will produce a positive externality because it will pay taxes,
reduce unemployment due to job market frictions etc. In a private sector context the new
ﬁrm could be a joint venture between an established ﬁrm (“the stakeholder”) and a smaller
ﬁrm with scarce abilities (“the shareholders”) that will lead to synergies. In either case, the
termination of the newly created ﬁrm could lead to an externality B for the stakeholder as
assumed throughout.
If the shareholders have an outside option with value equal to e v0, (such as investing
abroad) then the ﬁrm will only get started if
W0 − L + v0 + P (W0) ≥ W0 − L + e v0. (39)
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 3 9 )i st h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm to shareholders once started, while
the right hand side is the value of the outside option. To make the situation interesting,
suppose that the stakeholder enjoys no beneﬁti ft h eﬁrm does not get created and that
v0 < e v0 and U0 ≥ e v0 − v0. In such a situation, there is an incentive for the stakeholder to
extend an implicit guarantee such that







Moreover, the risk management rule should also satisfy (32) since the stakeholder has the
possibility of “walking away” in the future. The inequality (40) leaves room for many possible








while P0 = e v0−v0 when the stakeholder has all the bargaining power. I will focus on the
ﬁrst case, since the latter one can be handled analogously. Assuming that the shareholders
(or the stakeholder) still have to incur costs kb I(σ) for any risk management rule σ that is
adopted at time 0, then the policy that satisﬁes (41) as an equality and minimizes b I(σ) is
given as follows.
Lemma 7 Let P∗ (W) ≡ P(W;σ∗) be the value of the guarantee that is deﬁned in Lemma
4a n dl e tτ0 be the ﬁrst time that Wτ0 = L. Letting W0 denote the assets of the ﬁrm at
t =0 , and assuming that33 U0 ≥ P∗(W0), there exists a level of assets c W∗ ≤ W∗, such that
the optimal risk management rule prescribes the policy of equation (22) for t ≥ τ0,a n dt h e




σ1 if x<c W∗
σ2 if x ≥ c W∗
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presented a model, whereby a ﬁrm is bailed out so as to avoid costs associated with
bankruptcy. The optimal actions for the stakeholder, the ﬁrm and the lenders were derived
endogenously. Even though the presence of an implicit guarantee increases the shareholders’
incentives to take risk, it also makes it more and more costly for the stakeholder to continue
33The assumption U0 ≥ P∗ (W0) is made purely to simplify the proof and save space. A full discussion of
the optimal policy for arbitrary values of U0 is beyond the illustrative scope of this Lemma. An empirical
advantage of this assumption is that a ﬁrm that hasn’t received bailouts in the past will have less tight risk
limits than ﬁrms that have received bailouts in the past, since c W∗ ≤ W∗.
35providing the implicit protection.34
The optimal risk management rule is to increase volatility when the ﬁrm’s net worth is
high and reduce volatility when its net worth declines. This policy reduces future sharehold-
ers’ temptation to renege, when assets are safely above liabilities. At the same time, it keeps
the stakeholder at her participation constraint.
The predictions of the model seem to be qualitatively in line with existing risk manage-
ment practices that tighten risk limits in response to declining net worth. Therefore, the
model provides a potential justiﬁcation for existing risk management rules, and is consistent
with empirical phenomena such as ﬂight to quality.
34For a paper that shows that moral hazard is attenuated in an inﬁnite horizon setting, see e.g. Panageas
and Westerﬁeld (2005).
36A Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Let τW denote the ﬁrst passage time to some W>W t >L ,deﬁned as
τW =i n f s≥t{s : Ws ≥ W}. Consider the price of a guarantee that is terminated at either the







It is easiest to price this claim ﬁrst and then take the limit as W →∞in order to arrive at (8).






























W that satisﬁes (44), along with the boundary conditions (45) and (46) is straight-








+2 σ2 (r + λ)
σ2 > 0,




where C1,C 2 are arbitrary constants. One needs to determine the constants C1,C 2 so that (45)
37and (46) hold. Carrying out this computation, yields the following unique solution to (44), that


























It is now straightforward to verify that (48) is the solution to (43). Applying Ito’s Lemma to





































The second line in (49) is zero because of (46). The third line is zero because of (44). The fourth
line is zero because σP
(W)













Combining (45) and (50) leads to (43).
To conclude the proof, let W →∞in equation (48) and apply the monotone convergence











is convex in W, because












W − (r + λ)P(σ2) =0 . (51)
The boundary conditions at L and at +∞ are the same as in Lemma 1. Given the continuous
38diﬀerentiability of P(σ2), ac l a s s i c a lv e r i ﬁcation theorem along the lines of Fleming and Soner
(1993) implies that setting σt = σ2 is optimal.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show result 1, let U be any domain of the form: (L,W2) for arbitrarily
large W2 such that Wt <W 2 < ∞. Consider now any stopping time τU before Wt exits the domain






This local martingale property of e−(r+λ)tP (Wt) in the domain U implies that (12) holds and that
P ∈ C1 (for details see Øksendal (2003), Chapter 9). The ﬁrst part of the proof of result 2 is
contained in the text (see equation [14]). To see why limW→∞ P(W)=0 , deﬁne τL =i n f s≥t{s :










































Now, ﬁx an arbitrary ε>0 and choose large x such that e−(r+λ)(x−t) = ε
2B. The properties of






light of (52), this then implies that P(Wt) <ε .Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily small, the result
follows.
Assertion 3 contains three speciﬁc statements. The ﬁrst statement is that PW(L)=−1. To see



























































As the diﬀerential equation (12) has a classical solution35, PW is a continuous and hence bounded








.H e n c e t h e
integrand on the right hand side of equation (55) is a martingale. Therefore, the right hand side of
equation (55) is 0, and hence so must be the left side. This can only be the case if PW(L)=−1.
The proof that PW < 0 proceeds by contradiction. Assume otherwise. In particular assume
that there exist a W∗∗∗ >Lsuch that PW (W∗∗∗) > 0. Since PW(L)=−1 and the diﬀerential
equation (12) has a continuous ﬁrst derivative, there must be a point c W>Lsuch that PW(c W)=













> 0. Therefore, at c W the function P must have a local
minimum. Since P>0 for all W ≥ L and limW→∞ P(W)=0 , the function P must also have








< 0. But this is












< 0. Hence it must be the case that
PW(W) ≤ 0 for all W. Given that PW ≤ 0 it is now straightforward to use (12) to establish that
PWW = 2
σ2(W)W2 [−rPWW +( r + λ)P] > 0. In turn, PWW > 0 implies that PW is increasing
35See Øksendal (2003), Chapter 9
40throughout. Moreover it can never cross 0. Hence it must be bounded between PW(L)=−1 and
0 as was asserted above.
Proof of Lemma 4. A detailed proof of this Lemma would replicate the same steps as





2 PWW + rPWW − (r + λ)P if W>W ∗ ≥ L
σ2
1W2
2 PWW + rPWW − (r + λ)P if L ≤ W ≤ W∗





2 if W>W ∗ ≥ L
C11Wα+
1 + C12Wα−
1 if L ≤ W ≤ W∗




2 are deﬁned in (24). In order to be able to replicate the same





2 + C22 (W∗)
α
−
2 = C11 (W∗)
α
+







2 −1 + α−
2 C22 (W∗)
α−
2 −1 = α+
1 C11 (W∗)
α+









1 −1 + α−
1 C12 (L)
α−
1 −1 = −1 (58)
Solving for C11,C 12,C 22 from equations (56), (57), (58) leads to (23). Equation (25) follows imme-
diately by setting P(L)=B and solving for W∗.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The ﬁrst step towards proving Proposition 1 is to establish the
existence of a solution to the system of equations (20) and (21), satisfying π2(W∗)=0and
π2(x)
½
≥ 0 if x<W∗
≤ 0 if x>W∗ (59)
36In particular, these conditions will make it possible to apply Ito’s Lemma as in Lemma 1.
41with at least one of the two inequalities being strict for some values x. Furthermore, to provide
suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of policy (22), the following properties will also be required:
lim
x→∞ |π1(x)| < ∞ (60)
lim
x→∞ |π2(x)| < ∞ (61)
The next Lemma constructs an explicit continuous solution to π1,π2 that satisﬁes (20), (21), (59),
(60), (61) and π2(W∗)=0 .
Lemma 8 Let W∗ be given by (25). Then, there exist continuous functions π1 and π2 that solve
t h ep a i ro fd i ﬀerential equations (20), (21) and satisfy π2(W∗)=0 , (59), (60), (61).
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 .The proof proceeds by explicitly constructing two functions that satisfy
all the stated properties. Assume ﬁrst that W>W ∗. By the form of the conjectured optimal
policy, one needs to distinguish 3 sub-regions for x :
(a) L ≤ x<W∗
(b) W∗ ≤ x ≤ W
(c) x>W
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It remains to determine the 6 constants in the above equations in order to obtain the solution
to π1,π2. Starting with region (c), it is clear that (60), (61) can only hold if D13 =0 , since β+
2 > 0.
To ensure continuity of π1(x),π2(x) at point W, the constants D23,D 12,D 22 need to satisfy (after
some straightforward cancellations):
D12Wβ+





2 +1 − β−
2 (D22 − D23)Wβ
−
2 +1 =0 (63)




1 + D21 (W∗)
β
−
1 = D12 (W∗)
β
+







1 +1 − β−
1 D21 (W∗)
β−

















1 +1 − β−
1 D21 (W∗)
β−
1 +1 =0 (64)
Solving this system of equations leads to the following solution for π1,π2 :

















































































































































































By construction, π1(x),π2(x) are continuous and satisfy π2(W∗)=0 ,( 6 0 ) ,( 6 1 ) . I tr e m a i n s
to verify that this solution also satisﬁes (59). This follows from β+
2 > 0,β−
2 < 0 and also β+
1 >
0,β−
1 < 0. The proof for W<W ∗ follows similar steps and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 1 continued. Given the existence of an appropriate pair of co-state
variables π1,π2 it is now possible to verify optimality by using a standard suﬃciency theorem of
optimal control (see e.g. Leonard and Van Long (1992), p. 289). To save space, I omit a proof of
the suﬃciency theorem and make it available on request.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Π be the set of all participation compatible policies σ. The
ﬁr s ts t e pi no r d e rt oo b t a i nb I∗ is to ﬁnd a function g(Wt) such that
g(Wt) ≥ inf
t≥τ0
P (Wt;σs≥t) for all σ ∈ Π (65)
44Constructing such an upper bound is straightforward. First, ﬁxal e v e lW1 >Land let τ1 be
the ﬁr s tt i m ea f t e rτ0 such that Wt = W1. An upper bound to inft≥τ0 P (W1;σs≥t) is given by
the highest possible value Pτ1 that can be assigned by any participation compatible policy. Two





















Using an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 2, one can show that37 setting σs = σ1 for








will maximize the right hand side of (66). This is intuitive. In order to have the highest possible
ﬂexibility to promise a high level of Pτ1, one needs to set volatility prior to τ1 as low as possible.
More importantly, this simple observation suggests that it is possible to ﬁnd an explicit expression




2 uWWW2 + ruWW − (r + λ)u =0 , subject to the boundary conditions u(L)=B, and








































and hence it gives a closed form expression for the right hand side of (66).
Letting χ be the ﬁrst time after τ1 such that Wχ = L, a second observation about Pτ1 is that
37The proof of this fact follows steps similar to Lemma 2 and is ommited. It is available upon request.


















This bound is intuitive. It states that even if volatility is set at its maximum between times τ1 and
χ, the continuation value after that point cannot be larger than B.










satisﬁes the equation (65). In turn, this implies that for any
participation compatible policy




























where the rightmost equality follows from α(σ2)=α−
2 . It will be useful to establish a few properties













By its deﬁnition g(L)=B, and hence n(L)=0 . Also, the deﬁnition of g(W) implies that n(W) ≥ 0.
















These two last facts can be used to show that nW (L) > 0, and hence n>0 in a neighborhood of
L.
Finally, by assumption (9), α−
1
B









2 is always negative. Hence there





2 for all w ≥ Wu. Therefore n(w)=0for all
w ≥ Wu. Since the function n starts at 0 when W = L,a n db e c o m e s0 for all W ≥ Wu, and is





To compute this maximum it is easiest to take the log of n(W), diﬀerentiate with respect to W




















































































Straightforward, but tedious algebra can be used to show that this equation has a unique root.39
Having obtained b I∗ as a lower bound on b I(σ), it is now possible to verify the optimality of the
policy σ∗ of equation (22), by showing that b I(σ∗)=b I∗. As a ﬁrst step towards showing this, I use
the quantity W∗ as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 5 )a n ds h o wt h a tW∗ <W∗∗. After some manipulations





































































































where the equality follows from (56)-(57) and the inequality follows from α−
2 < 0,k<1, W∗
L > 1.
Combining (71) and (72) shows that nW (W∗) < 0. Hence it must be the case that W∗∗ <W∗.
Since the functions P(W) of equation (23) and u(W) coincide between L and W∗, and W∗∗ <
W∗, it follows that












































The ﬁrst equation in (73) is the deﬁnition of b I∗, the second and third equations follow from the
fact that u(W)=P(W) <B (W/L)α−
2 for all W ∈ (L,W∗]. The ﬁnal step of the proof is to verify
































⎦ = b I(σ∗). (74)
















is a declining function of W











































Using (75), it follows that (74) holds. Finally combining (74) and (73) implies that b I∗ = b I(σ∗).
Proof of Lemma 6. Lemma 2 has established that for any level of B, the policy σ∗ of
equation (22) is optimal, in the sense that it attains the lower bound b I∗ (which also depends on B).
Since the optimal policy σ∗ assigns the same value P(L)=B every time that Wt = L, it suﬃces
t oc h e c kt h a ti si so p t i m a lt os e tPτ0 = B. To verify this, note that the shareholders’ value if they
set Pτ0 = B, is given by V = B − kb I∗.D i ﬀerentiating V with respect to B, combining (70) with


























































2 < 0.H e n c eVB > 0, and hence it is optimal to set
P(L)=B.
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . The proof of this fact is rather straightforward. To save space, I
only give a sketch. First observe that the deﬁnition (37) implies that extending the duration of
ar i s km a n a g e m e n tr u l ef r o m[τ0,∞) to [0,∞) can never lower b I(σ),s i n c einft≥τ0 P (Wt;σs≥t) ≥
inft≥0 P (Wt;σs≥t). Furthermore, proposition 2 implies that any participation compatible commit-
ment will involve b I(σs≥0) ≥ b I∗. Therefore, it suﬃces to show that b I(σs≥0)=b I∗. Since the policy
48σ∗ is identical to the policy of equation (22) for t ≥ τ0, it is suﬃcient to show that Pt∈[0,τ0](Wt) ≥
Pt≥τ0(Wt). In turn this will automatically be the case if c W∗ ≤ W∗. Following a strategy similar to
Lemma 4, the value P(Wt) for t<τ 0, satisﬁes (12), P(L)=B, and limW→∞ P(W)=0 . Further-
more, c W∗ needs to be determined so that P(W0)=U0. Since U0 ≥ P(W0,σ∗
s≥τ0), it follows that
c W∗ ≤ W∗.
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